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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to lay the foundation for developing effective
strategies for coordinated use of computational simulation and experiments in
engineering design. The primary research objectives are to explore the drivers
behind the use of simulations and experiments in industry as related to decision
making. We analyze how simulation development integrates into the engineering
process, and analyze current simulation strategies as they relate to the product
development. The intent is to illuminate the issues surrounding the application of
simulation and experimentation that will lead to the ability to define a set of
corporate strategies that will enable companies to better integrate simulations
and experiment into their existing product development process. This thesis
suggests a set of Hypothesis related to decision making in engineering, and
probes into one of these hypotheses to investigate the confidence level
engineers exhibit when required to make a decision based on the presentation
method of a simulation. The Hypotheses discussed in this thesis provide a
starting point from which to explore dissertations on human-engineering process
integration. By better understanding the human in the engineering process, we
can better understand the engineering process.
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The Systems Engineering process is increasingly dependant on simulations to
fulfill a variety of design roles ranging from proposal development, parameter
estimation and design, to requirements validation. With the advent of the
computer age, simulations are proving more powerful than ever. Simulations are
developed to model, design, and even test system designs. However, the
increasing dependence on simulations has significant drawbacks as the human
is disengaged from the decision making process. For example, one of the major
factors in the launch disaster of the Milstar-3 satellite, a US government
communications satellite, was the simulated verification of system parameters
using design data rather than the actual flight parameters.I The simulated
parameters did not match the actual due to human error, and overconfidence in
the verification simulation resulted in loss of an $800M satellite.
Significant progress has been made in verification and validation (V&V), however
it still has some inherent limitations with respect to uncertainty in system design.
Computational simulations are not complete representations of reality. As a
result, the designer must decide the suitability of an experiment to the design
process, or phase of the design process. For example in the proposal
development phase, the simulation must prove that a particular design can meet
the proposed requirements. In the verification and validation phase, the goal of a
simulation may be to validate that a set of design parameters are adequate to
meet system requirements. The designer must carefully choose the fidelity of
simulation to run, assess the validity and applicability of the simulation results,
and present the simulation results in a manner that communicates the intended
message.
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The strategies for use of simulations are well documented in various companies'
system engineering processes. This thesis will lay the foundation for improving
the system engineering process and developing strategies to optimize the use of
simulations by examining various aspects of the system engineering process and
its interface with the human. Several projects are discussed that highlight the
issues surrounding human interface to the system engineering process. These
projects highlight various Hypotheses recommended for further study. Next, the
results of a simple experiment are presented that briefly touch one on the
recommended Hypothesis of study. The experiment investigates the decision
making process resulting from the use of simulations with regard to the
presentation style of the simulation. The experiment measures the confidence
level of a subject when asked to make decisions based on a text based, or
graphics based simulation output.
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2 Overconfidence in Engineering
The over confidence exhibited by simulation and model builders is not a recent
event. In 1597 Johannes Kepler published, The Cosmographic Mystery2, in
which he argued that the distances of the six known planets (Mercury, Venus,
Earth, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn) from the Sun were determined by the five
regular solids (Cube, tetrahedron, dodecahedron, icosahedron, and octahedron.)
He proposed that a planet's orbit was circumscribed about one solid and
inscribed in another. Figure 2-1 shows one such model.
Figure 2-1 Kepler's Model of the Solar System
After several trials, he managed to find an arrangement of nested regular solids
and spheres that "worked"; however, there were several discrepancies with the
model. The nested spheres and the planetary orbits did not fit together
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accurately, and Kepler had to adjust the thickness of each of the solids to
compensate, with no explanation as to the varying thicknesses of each of the
solids. Kepler was intimately familiar with the evidence of the planetary orbits, as
he himself collected the astronomical data used to develop the model. The
obvious discrepancies did little to sway his faith in the model, as he went to his
grave insisting that such a model existed. Such modifications of a model,
commonly known as "fudge factors" are prevalent in today's engineering world.
The resulting simulations and models engineers rely on to architect complex
systems lure the engineer into a counterfeit confidence of the resulting decision.
As a result, systems fail.
2.1 The Ariane 5 launch disaster:
Leveson suggests several factors indicating why systems fail in her paper The
Role of Software in Spacecraft Accidents1 . The paper is an insightful discussion
of the makings of five spacecraft accidents. Although the paper outlines many
contributing causes in these accidents, many causes resonate with the attribute
of overconfidence.
A dominant root cause common of the spacecraft accidents was the belief that
simple software routines do not require the resources typically needed to fully
test a particular function. Attention is diverted to functions that are perceived as
"more important" and resources are allocated accordingly. One particular
example stands out during development of the Ariane 5 program. During design
of the Ariane 5 launch vehicle, much of the code was reused from the Ariane 4
launch vehicle. The philosophy in place was; if the unit of code is not exhibiting
any failures, no effort is expended for further testing. The Inertial Reference
System (IRS) was one such unit of code reused from the Ariane 4. The IRS was
simulated in the Ariane 5 system with no adverse behavior; however, Ariane 4
trajectory data was used to perform the test, rather than Ariane 5 trajectory data.
The resulting "successful" simulation run, combined with the "don't fix it, if it isn't
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broken" policy resulted in acceptance of the IRS in the Ariane 5 software system,
and the code was not included in the overall system level simulation.
The Ariane 5 launch vehicle is a much larger rocket than the Ariane 4. As such
the trajectory data, particularly horizontal velocity, from the Ariane 5 is much
larger than the Ariane 4 would ever produce, different enough to overflow the 16
bit integer assigned to the horizontal velocity variable. The launch accident was
caused by this overflow exception error shutting down both the primary and the
secondary IRS units 30 seconds after lift off.
The engineers and managers responsible for the IRS were confident that
simulation to support IRS testing was adequate to provide reliable functionality.
They also assumed that the source of the simulation validated the performance!
They were wrong.
Other dominant root causes were diffusion of responsibility, poor oversight, poor
information flow, poor anomaly reporting structure, and misaligned
responsibilities. Many of these issues revolve around poor human integration
with the engineering process. Overconfidence in one form or another can
summarize all five of the spacecraft accident root causes.
2.2 Signal Processing Systems
Spacecraft are not the only engineering products that suffer from overconfidence
engineering. Interviews were conduced pertaining to industry projects that either
went wrong, or came close to going wrong 3. One project in particular, an aircraft
sensor subsystem for performing direction finding (DF) on radio signals, exhibited
similar overconfidence effects during system integration and test. The DF
system is supported by a calibration system used to calibrate the sensor for field
operation. The calibration system uses the DF array aperture dispersed about
an aircraft, the DF real time processing system, and a set of "off line" simulation /
calibration tools. The purpose of the calibration tools is to produce a reference
data set, from which the real time processing system can compute a line of
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bearing on a radio signal. Months of effort went into producing the simulation /
calibration software. Testing occurred in three phases. The first phase involved
entirely simulated data. Simulated array data was taken as input to the
calibration software. The software then processed the raw data to produce a
calibration table for the DF system. A system simulator was then used to test the
validity of the calibration table.
Once all tests passed, the second phase of test replaced the simulated input
data with test range data. The test range data was collected from a scale model
of the actual platform. The range data was used both for the calibration software
and as test data for DF system operation validation. The final test involved
integrating the real time processing system with the scale model to prove end-to-
end system functionality. All tests passed with flying colors.
The final step involved installing the system in the field. The real time system
was installed in the aircraft. After many check out tests, the aircraft was flown
over a signal generation range to provide calibration data for the aircraft.
Collection of the data required over 40 range flights, with multiple takeoffs and
landings. With each landing, the collected data was processed by the calibration
software and an updated calibration table was produced to encompass the data
set collected to date. In this manner, the previously collected data ranges could
be verified while the new data ranges were collected.
Half way through collection, the first verification runs came in, it was apparent
that something had gone wrong with the system. The bearing outputs from the
simulation no longer matched the reported bearings from the DF system. The
three step simulation process had failed us. The data handling algorithm that
produced the calibration table and the data handling algorithm in the real time
system no longer matched. Panicked investigation into the processing on both
ends revealed two major causes. The first cause involved a region of the
calibration table that had gone untested in previous simulations. This was due to
the scaling difference between the model and the live system. The scaling ratio
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was 10:1, so when the system was installed in the live aircraft, an entire section
of the calibration table had gone untested due to limitations in the test range.
During development it was assumed that if the calibration software worked for
the first 50% of the frequency range, it should work for the remaining frequency
range.
The second cause was more significant. The scale model of the aircraft had to
be tested with a scaled frequency in order to produce similar array data to the
live system. Thus, for a 10:1 scale model, in order to produce an array response
for 100 hertz, you need to transmit at 1000 hertz to compensate for the 10:1
physical bias. Unfortunately, physics doesn't scale with your model. In the
various frequency ranges the calibration table structure needed to be changed to
accommodate the new physical response.
Fortunately for the developer, the aircraft was hit by lightning the night after the
effects were discovered. The lightning caused damage to several array
elements, which required replacing. Once a DF array is replaced, the calibration
must begin all over, as the new antennas have a significantly different response
due to mounting and coupling constraints with the aircraft. The discrepancies in
the calibration software were fixed, and the calibration was completed without
further consequences, unlike the Ariane 5 disaster.
Two lessons in particular can be gleamed from this experience. Engineers tend
to exhibit overconfidence in extrapolation of system performance. They will test
a system at various points and have high confidence that it will work when
system performance is extrapolated outside the tested limits. This was apparent
in assuming the scale model tests would be adequate to support full scale
performance prediction. We will see this effect explored in the experiment run in
section 5. Subjects are asked to extrapolate a simulation results to predict the
outcome of a model that does not quite match the simulation.
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The second lesson is in prediction of environmental data. Again with the scale
model, physics dictates a different array response between a scale model and its
full size equivalent. The difference was drastic enough to require major sections
of calibration code to be re-written overnight. In our experiment, subjects are
asked to predict the outcome of a model running on a surface that does not
match the surface in the simulation.
The results of this study suggest one potential hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Better presentation of a system's data processing allows easier
adaptation of the system to new data effects.
In particular, if the data processing in the calibration software, as well as the real
system, provided a better real time display of the processing, adapting to the new
environment could have gone much smoother.
2.3 The Challenger Shuttle accident (0-Ring)
January 28, 1986 I was in a K-Mart in Fairfax Virginia waiting for a friend of mine
to get off work. As I waited by the electronics section full of TVs I casually
noticed the televised launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger, after all this was
the tenth Challenger launch, just another routine mission to space. 73 seconds
after launch, Challenger exploded. The root cause turned out to be
overconfidence in the O-ring integrity, in particular its resiliency in cold weather.
Edward R. Tufte, in his paper Visual and Statistical Thinking: Displays of
Evidence for making decisions4, provides an analysis of the situation that led to
the decision to launch the Challenger, even though the evidence advised against
the launch. Engineers at Thiokol (the booster rocket manufacturer) presented
NASA management with a 13 chart presentation. The presentation consisted
mostly of data printouts and hand written charts all of which presented the details
of the susceptibility of the O-Ring to cold temperatures. However, the
presentation was disorganized. It dove into a series of data points, one point
after another with no clear message. After 2 hours on a teleconference, NASA
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was unconvinced and decided to go ahead with the launch. The resulting
disaster is a keystone event in American history.
Tufte took the same data from the O-Ring report and was able to present the
data in a more convincing manner by using graphics to show the trend predicted
by the existing test data. He states, "Visual representation of evidence should be
governed by principles of reasoning about quantitative evidence. For information
displays, design reasoning must correspond to scientific reasoning. Clear and
precise seeing becomes as one with clear and precise thinking". Of course,
Tufte had the benefit of hindsight with which to make his point. It is very easy
after the fact, with plenty of time to analyze the data, to produce a more
convincing argument. Tufte's published his paper in 1997, eleven years after the
accident.
Tufte provides only two case studies to support his argument: the Challenger
disaster and the Cholera Epidemic of 1854. The analysis does not take into
account the cognitive behavior of the decision makers at the time of the incident.
The fact remains that the engineers at Thiokol did not have the necessary skills
to make their recommendation in an effective manner because they were under
serious pressure to make a recommendation. The text based presentation was
not effective in convincing NASA to scrub the launch. It remains to be seen
whether the graphical presentation suggested by Tufte would have changed the
confidence level enough to alter the decision. Data presented in section 5.7 of
this thesis suggests that a graphic presentation would have improved NASA's
confidence in the Thiokol recommendation. The confidence level of Thiokol data
presentation would be weighed against other considerations such as historical
performance, mission needs, political pressures, and more. The confidence level
shift exhibited by the experimental data in this thesis shows a definite shift
towards believing a graphical presentation. However it is not clear if this positive
shift would have been enough to alter the decisions made. There were simply
too many other factors involved in the decision.
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In today's System engineering environment, many of the tools and aids we use
for decision making provide prescriptive means of making decisions. Many
techniques border on including the cognitive element in their decision-making
process, but few to date provide any solid experimental evidence to prove their
techniques. In the next section, we will look at a few of these techniques and
assess them in light of cognitive evidence to support their claims of effectiveness.
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3 Current Analysis Approaches
A wealth of analysis approaches for decision making exist today in engineering
design. These tools range from mathematically based algorithms such as "One
Factor at a Time" techniques in Design of Experiments (DOE) to group
communication techniques such as Pugh's Concept Selection. Each of these
tools has strengths and weaknesses as applied to the engineering process. Yet
no one has measured the human aspect of these decision techniques. How
effective is Pugh's Concept selection in determining confidence in the selected
design? Many engineers believe it is a great tool for trading off system
concepts, but is has one critical weakness. The process is undercut by the
"group think" effect. When people are brought together in a room to make
decisions, the group will eventually merge to believe in one common viewpoint.
When the team at Digital Equipment Corporation came together to select the
concept for the next generation computing system, they all agreed on selecting
another VAX based system. Why did they not choose the Personal Computer
(PC)? Pugh's Concept selection allowed a group of people to better select the
wrong concept!
This section will briefly examine various decision making techniques and assess
them for their ability to integrate the human being into the process. We examine
each technique for its cognitive aspect.
3.1 Design of Experiments
The tools of Design of Experiments (DOE) are extremely effective in determining
optimal design parameters with regard to a set of performance criteria.
However, it is simply that, a design optimization tool. The techniques are highly
dependant on the specification parameters input to the process. Various
techniques exist within the realm of DOE to optimize the search for design
parameters. Full Factorial is an exhaustive search of the design space, while
other techniques such as "One Factor at a Time", or "Main Effects" attempt to
find the optimal or close to optimal solution with a much faster search technique.
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The tool its self, however, is not the focus of decision making, it is the way in
which the tool is used, and the decisions the tool supports. Similar to the way
we investigate simulations, DOE tools provide a means for improving decision-
making. In our investigation, we look at the decision-making that goes into the
specifications feeding DOE, as well as the decision-making on designing the
experiments performed. The confidence in the tool is a function of the fidelity of
the chosen experiments. DOE techniques and simulations play a very similar
role in the engineering process. The decision-making strategy surrounding both
is similar.
One potential area of exploration in DOE is to assess the confidence engineers
have in using various DOE techniques against design problems. Engineers,
being thorough by nature, will tend to default to full factorial experiment
techniques. With computers running faster every year, most design problems
become recognizable even with a large number of factors. How is confidence
affected when engineers apply other DOE techniques such as "One Factor at a
Time", or "Factional Factorial" techniques. Experiments could be designed to
measure the confidence level in these techniques, in a similar way that
confidence is being measured in the experiment run to support this thesis.
3.2 Decision Based Design
Decision based design is fundamentally based on the principle that a decision in
the design process results in an irrevocable use of resources. In essence, when
an engineer makes a decision on a particular design issue, the door is closed on
going back and changing the design parameter. The tools and techniques used
in this framework rely heavily on employing a simulation that is well suited to
making the design decision. As we will see in the experiment section of this
thesis, engineering confidence levels will be affected by how well the simulation
matches the design. One small aspect of this field is measured in the
experiment set forth in this thesis by asking a subject to extend a simulation
designed to estimate the outcome of one model to help predict the outcome of a
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slightly modified model. As we will see, a measurable drop in confidence occurs
when simulations are employed outside their specific domain.
Other experiments should focus on a more detailed measurement of this effect.
Simulations can be built around a specific model. An experiment subject can
then be asked to formulate predictions about a variety of models, each one
being slightly more different from the simulation. By measuring the deviation of
a model from its reference simulation, experimenters can construct a measure of
the confidence levels to help guide engineers on the use of simulations for
increasingly divergent models.
3.3 Cognitive Style
Cognitive style attempts to describe the fundamental human nature behind an
engineer's decision-making. Engineers, after all are people with cognitive
behavior just like any other field. People will behave in ways that computers
simply cannot predict, but which can be measured for trends. It is this analysis
that we believe can improve the system engineering process.
Engineers typically exhibit several cognitive aspects that affect the engineering
process. Emotional attachment to the engineer's product, perception of the
quality of a product given its perceived source, and the effects of group
dynamics are but a few of the "unpredictable" effects we will attempt to measure
as a result of this and follow on research.
Emotional attachment to an engineer's product involves the pride that people
take in his/her work. One study conclusion by Ariely5 shows that people need to
be paid twice as much to get rid of a good, as compared to buying it. What
implication does this have on the engineering process? Engineers show the
same behavior in their work environment. An engineer will exhibit pride in
ownership of his/her set of products, whether developed by that engineer, or
even inherited by others. The engineer's collection of knowledge and products
become his/her credibility. The engineer is unwilling to give up that perceived
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credibility, even when it is clearly detrimental to his/her own career. In an
interview with one Engineering Fellow, the topic of career choice came up. We
discussed the new direction Raytheon was taking into the realm of large system
engineering and integration. The Engineering Fellow stood firm and stated, "I am
a signal processing engineer with a strong mathematics background. This
Systems Engineering is of little interest to me, and they can never make me do
it." This particular engineer took such high stock in his own perceived credibility
that he refused to see the value in the new company direction. His refusal to
give up "goods" left him vulnerable in obtaining better "goods".
Another key cognitive study is discussed in Ariley's work6 . In his study, people
who pay more for an energy drink rated a higher utility from that drink during a
workout, than did people who got the (same) drink at budget price. This effect is
commonly referred to in the engineering world as "drinking the Kool-Aid" in which
an engineer will believe something to be true based solely on the perception of
the idea rather than facts and data. We saw this effect in the Challenger disaster
where the NASA engineers believed the launch conditions safe. Engineers are
susceptible to this effect in that the overconfidence typically exhibited is also
difficult excavate, more so when the perception is supported by a group
environment.
Group dynamics is an important aspect and deserves further analytical study.
Many tools exist that suggest what people should do to improve one process or
another, but much work needs to be done to develop a fundamental basis.
Experiments must be run to quantify the effects of various tools. Many people
agree that tools such as "House of Quality" improve the engineering process. No
quantitative evidence exists to support how much it helps, and how much it hurts
the process. If we are to develop a system engineering discipline, it must be
founded in quantitative evidence. The next section begins to analyze some of
the embedded effects of uncertainty and overconfidence. This section is not
meant to solve the problem, but merely to suggest areas of further study. Each
topic deserves to have the research performed to quantify the effect and form a
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solid basis from which to assess all of systems engineering. System Engineering
needs a foundation comparable to the physical equations from which engineering
emerges. That foundation lies in the human mind.
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4 Uncertainty and Overconfidence
Uncertainty and Overconfidence are interrelated characteristics in the decision
making process. Uncertainty pertains to the physical outcome of a process,
while confidence pertains to the human's perception of uncertainty. Each is
typically analyzed in isolation, but any practical application must account for the
interplay between uncertainty and confidence.
Uncertainty is a characterized as the deviation in possible outcomes. For
example, the load capacity of a communication system assumes an estimated
number of users as a function of time. The system is built to handle some
affordable percentage of users above this amount. The actual number of users
will constantly vary around this number. A higher number of users will increase
revenue, a positive outcome, while a lower number of users will reduce expected
revenue, a negative outcome. The expected value and the standard deviation of
this scenario are based solely on the physical process being measured.
In contrast to this, the confidence level of the designer can impact the
effectiveness of the product. A designer who is overconfident of the estimated
usage rate will design the system tailored to that rate. This rate can be much
lower, or even much higher than a well analyzed expected rate. A good example
of this is the first release of the iPod. Demand for the product was a lot higher
than expected. Manufacturing could not keep up with the demand. "The
demand is a lot higher than we thought, and we're limited in how many we can
manufacture."7 Mr. Jobs did not adequately design the manufacturing capacity
for iPods to meet demand. Remember that Mr. Jobs was also the motivation
behind the Macintosh Computer. In their hearts and minds, Steve Jobs and his
development team believed that the Macintosh computer would be on every desk
top around the world. This did not happen. As a result, Steve Jobs may have
been adversely influenced by this past experience and have taken a risk adverse
position in the Pod market.
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To the opposite extreme, the designers of the IRIDIUM system believed satellite
phone service was the wave of the future. Raymond Leopold, chief technology
officer of Iridium, stated "If you believe in God, Iridium is God manifesting himself
through us."8 The leadership was so certain of the success of the project, they
believed a "manifest destiny" was in order. The outcome was failure. Very few
were willing to pay the high cost of phone service.
In both of these cases, the confidence level of people had a definitive influence
on the resulting success, or failure of the project. These examples lead to a
Hypothesis: The confidence level of a decision maker will amplify a decision
maker's natural utility, regardless of directly conflicting evidence presented to the
decision maker.
4.1 Learning and Decision Making
What causes this overconfidence in decision makers? The first step is to
characterize the phenomenon, with a set of verifiable Hypotheses.
Engineers, in general, go though a process of building expertise in their field of
interest in distinct cycles. The cycle begins with a "blank slate", early in his/her
career where, for one reason or another, the engineer is required to learn about a
new field. This will happen many times in an engineer's career, starting with
his/her academic career, throughout his/her professional career, and particularly
when the engineering environment requires a drastic shift in career focus, or
career tools. This last phenomenon was evident with the introduction of
computers to the engineering environment. As computers became more popular,
and more powerful, more and more engineers had to set aside their slide rules to
keep up with the breakthrough speed available using computers to perform
analytical studies. As such, computers became a trusted method of dealing with
complexity. The MatlabTM analytical software package is a prime example of how
a computer based software tool took the place of basic slide rule analysis. In the
1970s, in order to compute the estimated performance for a Radio Direction
Finding system, the analysis engineer would pull out a physics book and an
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electromagnetic engineering reference. The engineer would then proceed to
design a system on paper to meet the performance criteria required of the
system. After weeks, or even months of analysis with paper and pencil, the
engineer would produce an array design with a set of performance curves, all
analytical, predicting the performance of the system. The next step would be to
build a prototype array and place it in a test environment to measure the array
response, with pencil and paper, in an engineering notebook. The analysis
would be redone with the new collected data to verify the originally computed
performance curves. Months later, the direction finding array would be ready to
build and field.
As computers entered the engineering world, much of this computational load
was transferred to the computer, but as a new instrument, the computer was
checked and compared against the analytical studies. Early computers were
slow and cumbersome with low computational capability and as such, were not
completely trusted to perform the expected computations reliably. Human errors
from entering the wrong punch card, or translating the wrong variable were
common. As computers became faster and easier to use, they also became
more trusted. Computational analysis that once took weeks or months could now
be performed in mere hours. In fact, with today's computational capability, a
laptop computer can perform in a few minutes the equivalent of months of
manual repetitive computational analysis. With this great power, however,
comes a great responsibility. Engineers must be cognizant of what the computer
is actually doing to produce the results. This responsibility is lost with the advent
of "packages" that do all the basic work for you. One can go on the Internet
today and purchase, for $399.00, a MatlabTM signal processing package to
compute any set of signal processing filters one can imagine. The software is
easy to use, and most of the time produces a viable set of coefficients. The basic
concepts of filter design are thus lost to all but the most intimate with that
knowledge. The engineer no longer understands the basic methodology behind
computing filter coefficients, only that the software produced "something". With
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great confidence, these engineers plug the coefficients into a real time
processing system only to find that the outcome does not match what is
expected.
Another commonly used engineering practice is the "Rule of Thumb". Engineers
deal with complexity by creating short cut methods to approximate engineering
observations. Some rules of thumb such as "Moors Law" are general
approximations that are appropriate for approximating processor speeds at a
future point in time. Suppose the basis behind the rule of thumb was not well
understood, and that engineers constantly used "Moors Law" to compute
processor performance in the future. Suppose then that a customer requests
your company to build a system that requires as yet unattainable processing
speeds, and you rely on your engineers to design a system to be delivered with a
processor that will be released in two years time. Would you rely on Moors Law
to design the system? Most engineers would say NO. However, engineers use
such rules of thumb on a daily basis to predict and design to system performance
parameters.
One example is the "Dana Johnson Fudge Factor". This rule of thumb is named
after an RF engineer who observed a peculiar physical phenomenon in Direction
Finding array processing. When predicting the differential phase response of a
pair of RF antenna elements, the ideal equation is D=2Dd/. Where d is the
distance in meters between the two antennas, and D is speed of light "c" divided
by the RF frequency f. After years of collecting data, Dana observed that the
phase response never quite matched the ideal response. This was observed
across various types of arrays, and various types of collection systems. The
"average" factor to account for this difference was mandated as 0.895. If this
factor was merely an estimate, why is it not 0.9? The extension to three decimal
places gave credibility to the factor, beyond what is normally deserved. In fact,
the factor was the computer computed "average" across many data sets.
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A similar incident occurred on a helicopter simulation program. Amongst the
many gauges in a helicopter cockpit is one called the "Rotor Power Torque
Gauge". The physics and mathematics behind computing this readout is a
simple equation, and was incorporated easily in the helicopter simulator. The
readout was checked for accuracy against the predicted values across various
operational scenarios. When a helicopter pilot was asked to take the simulation
for a test ride, he noticed the torque gauge reading was "too low by about 50%".
The engineers had gone through extensive trials. The simulation and predictions
were thoroughly verified. The computer, however, simply did not match actual
data. In the end, the engineers simply added the fudge factor and the helicopter
pilot accepted the system.
Hypothesis: Engineers will initially trust a computer outcome, even if it is
completely wrong.
To understand this phenomenon a bit better, an analysis is presented of how
engineers obtain their knowledge bases. An engineer begins building his/her
knowledge base through a process of trial and error; experimentation, or
capitalizing on the trial and error of others; reading, coursework, etc. As the
engineer builds his/her knowledge base, that engineer becomes more confident
in his/her abilities to solve engineering problems. As the knowledge base
continues to grow, the engineer can now use his/her knowledge base to make
predictions about engineering outcomes. Eventually, if the engineer continues
on this track, he/she becomes a domain expert in his/her chosen field of study.
An engineer would the confidently use the knowledge base and tools developed
to not only solve and predict engineering problems, but also to teach others to
follow the same knowledge path.
This phenomenon is very similar to the way a company builds expertise and
experience for a particular product line. The phenomenon is well documented in
"The Innovators Dilemma" (Christensen)9 as the "S-Curve". Companies start with
a great product idea that is only marginally developed. Innovation occurs at a
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high rate as the product matures. When the product reaches maturity, innovation
slows down to the point where a dominant design emerges, and major product
innovation is no longer practical.
Companies built around mature products display many of the same
characteristics as domain experts. Both mature companies and domain experts
have put a lot of work into developing their "products". Mature companies have
invested in product innovation to produce a market dominant product. Domain
experts have invested in knowledge gathering to arrive at a domain expert
knowledge base. Mature companies have developed products tailored to their
customer base. Domain experts develop a knowledge base tailored to their
chosen field of expertise.
Christensen clearly outlines the fate of mature organizations and their inevitable
march towards failure. The fundamental premise lies in his fifth principle "The
pace of technology outstrips the pace of demand for the technology". Is the
same thing true for knowledge? Are engineers under influence of the same
phenomenon?
Hypothesis: Domain experts exhibit many of the same characteristics as mature
companies. Both are under "market" pressure to maintain domain expertise, and
as such are vulnerable to the same overconfidence dilemma.
The effect can be compounded by a phenomenon known as "Group Think". In
"The Soul of a New Machine"10 Kidder, describes the work environment of a
"Skunk Works" organization within Data General. Kidder describes an
environment in which engineers have focused their efforts for the sole purpose of
developing what became the Eclipse MV/8000 product line. The environment is
best compared to a religious cult. Members on the team "Don't work for Money",
they work for the challenge. Upon hiring one young engineer, Carl Alsing
claimed, "It was kind of like recruiting for a suicide mission. You're gonna die, but
you're gonna die in glory."
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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that a group of people cannot arrive at
rational decisions. Arrow states an example; In a three person group, assume
person 1 prefers option A over B over C, person 2 prefers option B over C over
A, and person 3 prefers option C over A over B. If each member in the group
has an equal vote, then the group can never come to consensus amongst the
three options. If option A and B are assessed, two out of three will prefer A. If
then option C is presented, it will be preferred (two to one) over option A. If then
option B is presented, it will be preferred (two to one) over option C. Then if
option A is presented, it will be preferred (two to one) over option B. The group
will spend eternity voting amongst the three options.
In reality, significant pressures exist within a group dynamic for people to "fit in."
In the extreme, One can pull people from a group and ask them any question and
will get the same response from each member! The group dynamics amplifies
the confidence of the group as a whole. As exhibited in the General Dynamics
case, engineers from vastly different backgrounds all came together, united
behind a common goal, isolated against the world. Their individual preferences
were supplanted by the group dynamics. The resulting engineers, looking for a
purpose, exhibited immense overconfidence in their decisions. They believed
they were the future of the company, the last hope against immense competition.
They believed they could win. They were wrong. The Eclipse MV/8000 product
line was never able to take away enough market share from DEC's VAX product
line to survive.
4.2 Obedience to Authority
Is this phenomenon unique to groups? In 1974, Stanly Milgram published his
book "Obedience to Authority"" in which he describes a set of psychological
experiments performed to determine people's perceptibility to authority. At the
time, people were stunned to learn of the sad tales of Nazi Germany. Particularly
shocking were the war crimes and monstrosities committed by such high ranking
officials as Eichmann, whose claim was that he was "simply following orders."
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How can a person commit such atrocities and claim to simply be following
orders?
Milgram decided to perform a series of experiments focusing on obedience to
authority to try to answer this question. In his experiment, two individuals would
arrive at the experiment center. They would meet the instructor conducting the
experiment. This instructor posed as an authority figure by displaying credentials
such as a white lab coat and clipboard, and discussing the experiment with
respect to scientific publications. One particular book about how people learn
was clearly displayed and referred to in the discussion. The two subjects were
escorted into the experiment room. Dividing the room was a large bank of
equipment, with a series of switches. Each consecutive switch was numbered
from 1 to 30. Labels above the numbers started at "Slight Shock" to "Danger:
Sever Shock", and ending simply with "X X X". One of the participants was then
strapped in a chair to prevent movement and an electrode was placed on his/her
arm. This role was called the learner. The other individual was taken to the other
side of the equipment where they were instructed to read a list of two word pairs.
This role was called the "teacher". The teacher would then ask the learner to
read them back. If the learner got the answer correct, they would then move on
to the next set of words in the series. However, if the answer was wrong the
teacher was informed by the instructor that they were required to administer
shock to the learner. These shocks first started at 15 volts (switch 1) and
increased to 450 volts (switch 30) for each incorrect response. Important to note,
that the teacher was never coerced into flipping the switch. They were simply
told by the instructor "the experiment required them to continue." The teacher
was fully under the assumption that they were administering discipline to the
learner however, the only time the machine administered shock was at the
beginning of the experiment when the instructor administered a shock to the
teacher so that they would know the magnitude of the shock. The learner was a
confederate who was never actually harmed. Various versions of the experiment
were run.
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Before the experiment was run, the participants were surveyed and asked how
far they would go before stopping the experiment. In the first version, the teacher
was kept completely remote and not able to see or hear the learner. This version
was called "remote". In the next version, the teacher was able to hear the
learner. In many runs of this experiment, the learner would respond with "Ugh" at
the one setting, increase to "intense agonizing screams" around the 20 setting,
and fall silent after setting 22. This version was called "Voice". The third version
entailed a similar procedure to "voice", but the teacher was also able to see the
learner. This was called "Visual". The next procedure introduced "Touch", where
the instructor would check the pulse of the learner after each shock.
The results are shown in the Table 4-1. Of particular note is setting "10". The
learner would say "Ugh!!! Experimenter! That's all. Get me out of here. I told you
I had heart trouble. My heart's starting to bother me now. Get me out of here,
please. My heat's starting to bother me. I refuse to go on. Let me out." Of
course, the learner was never actually getting shocked as he/she was "in" on the
experiment. Note that a significant portion of the participants proceeded past the
"10" setting.
Milgram then decided to stage two peers in with the subject, so that now there
were three teachers sitting side by side. At the 10 setting, the first peer would
walk out. The second peer would walk out at the 14 setting. The resulting
distribution shows a definite shift, in the wrong direction! Only three subjects
walked out at the 10 stage. It wasn't until the second peer walked out that a
majority of the subjects would walk out. However, 15 people still continued on
after the second peer walked out.
Finally, Milgram set up the experiment to include two instructors, at the same
time, reverting back to only one learner. At the "10" setting, one of the two
experimenters would express dissatisfaction with the experiment, get up and




Shock Level Voltage Survey Baseline Remote Voice Visual Touch Peers Scientists
Slight Shock _______ __
1 15 5
2 30 1





7 105 5 1 1
a 120 8___
Strong Shock
9 135 6 1 1 1
10 150 35 5 10 16 3 First peer out 18
11 165 3 1 4 1
12 180 11 1 2 3 1
Very Strong Shock___ _________
13 195 3 4
14 210 1 1 12 Second peer out
15 225 1 _ _ 1 1 _ ____
16 240 1 _ _ _ _ ___ _ _
Intense Shock _______ __
17 255 1 1 1
18 270 ____1 _ _ 4
19 285 ____ 1 1 ____ __ ______
20 300 4 5 1 5 1
Extreme Itensity Shock__________ _____ ______
21 315 4 3 3 2 2
22 330 2 3
23 345 1 1 1
24 3601 1 1
Danger: Severe Shock _______
25 375 _ 1 1
26 390 _______ ___ __ __ ______
27 405____ __
28 420____ __
29 435 ________ ___ __ ___ ___ 1 _ _____
30 450 26 25 16 12 4
Mean Maximum Shock 8.83 27 24.5 20.8 17.9 16.5 10
% Giving Maximum Shock 0% 65% 63% 40% 30% 10% 0%
Table 4-1 Milgram's Experiment Results
Milgram stated in his book, "It is ironic that virtues of loyalty, discipline, and self-
sacrifice that we value so highly in the individual are the very properties that
create destructive organizational engines of war and bind men to malevolent
systems of authority." (Obedience to Authority, 1974, p.188)
The obvious, and popularized outcome of this experiment is the obedience to
authority phenomenon clearly displayed in the test data. In fact, it is the peer
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group result we should also focus on. Note, the results at the "10" setting. When
only one teacher was present, a significant portion (10-16) dropped out when
they realized the learner was being hurt. The "Remote" is discounted since the
teacher had no way of knowing the impact of administering the punishment. This
number dropped to 3, even with one peer walking out when a peer group was
involved. It wasn't until the other peer walked out that a larger portion of subjects
stopped the experiment. The subject maintained enough confidence to continue
with the experiment, as long as they had a peer present. This peer group effect
deserves further study. Is it possible that the very peer groups we rely on in
engineering to enhance the fidelity of our engineering predictions is forcing us
into an abnormally high confidence of our engineering predictions?
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Figure 4-1 Milgram's Experiment: Peer Group Effect
In order to study the peer group effect we propose two hypotheses:
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Hypothesis: People will make decisions with enhanced confidence if they believe
some authority supports that decision, regardless of whether the authority truly
exists.
Hypothesis: Peer groups, as compared to individuals, will display abnormally
high confidence levels as long as the group maintains cohesion. Once cohesion
is lost, the group confidence will disintegrate.
4.3 Four Quadrants of Knowledge
The way people make decisions and the impact of confidence on those decisions
requires us to focus on the interplay between a person's knowledge base and
his/her confidence level. People use a process of developing models of the
world based on one of two different techniques. The first technique is Hypothesis
centric, while the other technique is Observation centric. In the hypothesis
centric technique, the scientist will first form a hypothesis to be tested. Data is
gathered in search of supporting evidence for the hypothesis. Any data that does
not support the hypothesis is scrutinized and eliminated, while supporting
evidence is venerated. Many decision makers use this technique, particularly
when the decision maker is one or more levels removed from the data source.
The decision maker has a hypothesis, a.k.a. gut feeling, for which he/she wishes
to find supportive evidence. The decision maker typical goes to great lengths to
"spin" the data in a way that supports his/her hypothesis. We see this everyday
in political systems around the world.
The second approach, observation centric, is typical of modern scientific and
engineering approaches. This approach may or may not start with a hypothesis.
In either case, observations are made and a hypothesis is formed or changed to
support the observed data. The more common form is to formulate a hypothesis,
gather evidence, then modify the hypothesis to match the evidence.
Throughout this cycle the confidence level of the observer is modified by the
collected observations. When observations match the observer's hypothesis,
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confidence goes up. When they do not, confidence diminishes, the hypothesis is
reassessed, and confidence is rebuilt.
The confidence level, however, can also impact the search for observations. An
engineer with abnormally low confidence will tend to question observations to the
point where only those observations that clinically fit the hypothesis will be
accepted. On the other hand, an engineer with unusually high confidence level
will tend to innocently discount observations that contradict the hypothesis.
Furthermore, engineers with very high confidence in their hypotheses will no
longer associate observations with their hypotheses. The new evidence will
simply be discounted as not having relevance.
Engineers tend to migrate through various levels of confidence and knowledge
throughout the learning process. These states are inter-related such that the
varying combinations of Confidence and Knowledge describe mental states of an
engineer at different times in their career. The resulting confidence exhibited in
each of these states directly impacts the decision making ability of the engineer.
Starting in the "Steady State Knowledge" state, the engineer has accumulated a
set of base knowledge he/she uses in his/her daily work life. The engineer is
successful with high confidence in his/her decision making ability and is settled
into a comfort zone in which his/her daily life consist of comfortable challenges
and routine. Most engineers operate in this zone. They come to work each
morning ready to tackle the work for the day in an expected and predictable
manner. Software designers develop code, system engineers analyze
requirements, and life goes on.
Then something happens. An event occurs that significantly challenges the
steady state. Perhaps a software test goes seriously awry, or an architecture is
challenged with an unworkable dilemma. An organization may reach a critical
juncture in which the current management style must be changed. The events
can be practically anything, but all have the common attribute in that they
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challenge the steady state. One such dramatic event was the Challenger Shuttle
disaster. Up until the explosion, NASA management was confident in the
successful outcome of the space flight. Even the Thiokol engineers and
management were not convinced enough of the data to stand firm on their
recommendation to scrub the launch. The event spawned an investigation.
Confidence in the Space Shuttle program was severely diminished and all flights
were cancelled for 21% years after the incident. The Hypothesis of safe and
"routine" space flight was challenged.
This state is typical of many programs as they find discrepancies in their base
assumptions. Early in the engineering process, bugs are expected, although not
necessarily welcome. Engineers' confidence will typically drop some as they
deal with the design issues associated with the bugs, and implement fixes to
accommodate the design errors. In the middle of the design cycle, typically
around the integration phase, the effect is more pronounced as the pressures to
meet schedule milestones increase. Post delivery, the effect is unexpected and
rare. The effect can be staggering, as we saw in the challenger disaster.
Even in the learning process, when an engineer or scientist discovers a
challenge to his base knowledge, the same effect occurs. The most recent
example is the apparent discrepancy in the velocity of the Voyager I & 11
spacecraft as they exit our solar system into deep space. The velocity of these
spacecraft is slowing down, completely unexpected, given modern
characterizations of the universe. What is causing this? Theories of "Dark
Matter" and "String Theory" abound, but the bottom line is, our knowledge base
of the universe has been challenged by this event12 .
In the worst case, this effect is disastrous. Other examples include the failed
Mars Orbiter, the Titanic, the Tacoma Narrows Bridge (a.k.a. Galloping Gertie),
and the collapse of the World Trade Center Buildings. Although many of these
events disrupt our lives, non-disastrous events are far more conventional and
less notorious. The Direction Finding project discussed earlier was an extremely
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successful project even though it involved the most disastrous event with which
author has had to deal. Discovering the bug proved a far better option that
dealing with the effects post delivery. The Voyager I & 11 spacecraft velocity
discrepancies are a fantastic opportunity to probe the foundations of our scientific
knowledge.
Steady State of Knowledge 4-
- Base Knowledge Awareness and
- High Confidence Acceptance of














in new Hypothesis H
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Modify Hypothesis - Low Confidence
in light of new data - Gaining Understanding
t r Overcoming Limitations
Knowledge
Figure 4-2 Knowledge versus Confidence: Four Zones of Awareness
Regardless of how it came about, the engineer now finds him/herself at a
fundamental decision point, particularly in crossing the boundary from the upper
left quadrant in Figure 4-2 into the lower left quadrant. In the case where the
effect is not disastrous (or even discovered by anyone other than the engineer),
he/she may take the hypothesis based approach, and discredit the new
knowledge as an "anomaly", or perhaps probe into the discrepancy and modify
his/her hypothesis accordingly. In the case of a software design, the new data
could simply be a test article discrepancy, or it could be a fundamental flaw in






to modify his/her hypothesis to reflect the new data. As we saw in the
Challenger disaster, ignoring the data or incorrectly viewing the data, which is
just as bad, directly led to the disaster. The management at Thiokol had just
enough confidence in the solid rocket booster, based on past experience, to
back down from recommending an aborted launch. Better presentation of the
data may have disrupted that confidence enough to provide a clear argument to
NASA management.
Once the engineer has modified his/her hypothesis, the process of knowledge
building can begin. The engineer, having just modified his/her hypothesis, will
begin to gather evidence to support the new hypothesis. Confidence in the new
hypothesis is fairly low at this point, as the engineer refines the hypothesis into
one that accepts the new knowledge. Having recently been challenged, the
engineer continues to display a low confidence level until the Hypothesis has
matured into a defensible position against both new and old data.
In the learning process, this effect is exhibited when the student discovers (to
him/her) a new characterization of knowledge. A student who is struggling with
calculus for the first time, or a seasoned engineer delving into a new area of
study will display this effect. The engineer displays low confidence in the new
area until he/she has gathered enough knowledge to become fluent in the new
area. As the engineer develops more a greater knowledgebase, his confidence
grows and he/she is propelled to the expert level.
Ultimately, the engineer finds him/herself in the expert state. Here confidence
has been regained. The new knowledge has been molded into a working
knowledge of the subject area. The engineer has gained credibility in the area
and is sought out by other engineers to solve problems in that domain. Typical
experts consist of University Professors, Company Subject Matter Experts, or
Specialty area expert consultants. Companies will call these people anything
from Chief Engineers, Engineering Directors, Engineering Fellows, or a wealth of
other exuberant titles. These people are the technology experts who have,
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through study or experience, built up a reputation for solving problems in a
domain area.
Companies and/or Programs can build up this expertise as well. Raytheon is
know for it's Missile systems, and Air Traffic Control Radar. When you think
"Skunk Works", Lockheed Martin comes to mind. Each of these companies has
built a reputation for excellence in a variety of areas. NASA is the current expert
for space exploration, although that is being challenged by both foreign
governments and the commercial sector.
The Expert state is characterized by high confidence with a dominant knowledge
base. The Expert has just build up his/her confidence level through years of
hard work. As the Expert begins to capitalize on this well earned reputation,
he/she focuses all his/her effort on maintaining and "selling" the expertise. At
some point the expert becomes comfortable with the knowledge base. He/she
has solved many problems successfully, and the new knowledge has begun to
prove itself in the appropriate environment. The expert becomes complacent.
Once this happens, the expert slides back into the "steady state knowledge"
state. Whether a company or a person, the entity has become comfortable with
the state of expertise. Until, that is, the next dramatic event.
In all cases, the spark of a discrepancy is the fuse that sets the engineer into a
cycle of building new knowledge. Something occurs that challenges the state of
knowledge. In a benign environment, or early in the development process this
will not have a big impact. Late in the development cycle, the impact can be as
drastic as loss of life. Serious study should be given to determine ways of
finding these sparks without waiting for a disastrous event to occur. Engineering
methods need to be developed to draw out these discrepancies early in the
development process. And in the case of personal knowledge never letting the
engineer "get comfortable" with his/her knowledge.
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The impact of these events can vary drastically with a distribution much like the
distribution allocated to uncertainty in general. The challenger disaster involved
loss of life, but in general was a rare event. The event involved a mature
product, well into its operational phase. The DF software error during final I&T
was more likely to occur, but the impact was not as great. The velocity errors of
the Voyager I & II spacecraft, on the other hand are an opportunity to explore a
greater understanding of the universe. We have before us a distribution that
involves both positive and negative outcomes. What must be explored is the
benefit of techniques that can coerce the events to occur earlier in the
development process. How do we get engineers to look past their comfort
zones of knowledge to accelerate the learning process.
4.4 Uncertainty in Product Development
The question arises as to the impact of overconfidence to an engineering
project. After all, how big an impact can a little overconfidence have? It may
introduce a few extra bugs, or add a little overtime at he end of a project, but can
it really have a big impact on the program? To answer this question a system
dynamics model is employed called the "Capstone" model. This model can be
used along with historical data to model the programmatic execution of an
organization developing a product. The historical data is used to tweak a set of
variables, such as mixture of experienced staff to new staff, effects of schedule
pressure on quality, or maximum and minimum times to discover rework. These
and many other variables can be modified, and the resulting cost, schedule,
rework rate and other performance variables are tuned to match the historical
performance data. Once a model has been calibrated for a particular
organization, it can be used to predict performance on similar programs, or used
to assess the impact of policy changes on execution of engineering programs. A
Systems dynamics model of the "Capstone" program is shown in Figure 4-3. In
our case, we will use this model to introduce a new phenomenon. We will
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Figure 4-3 System Dynamics Model of the Capstone Project: Modified to reflect Overconfidence Impact
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Overconfidence will directly impact the quality of a product. As shown in Figure
4-3 in the outlined area. As overconfidence rises, quality goes down, which
increases the amount of rework for the project. As the buildup of undiscovered
rework is later discovered, it increases the amount of total work that needs to be
done. Working off this new, larger amount of work will have the impact of
reducing work progress, as well as increasing the time it now takes to discover
any new rework. This is primarily due to the limited amount of experienced
resources available to the project. The increased time it takes to discover the
rework will then increase the overconfidence in the engineers. Engineers will
tend to believe a work package is complete unless a bug is found in the package.
The longer the erroneous package goes undiscovered, the higher the confidence
of the engineer. The resulting loop is dominant in the "Capstone" Model:
Loop Number 2 of length 10
* Effect of Human Overconfidence on Quality
* Quality
" Rework Generation
* Work to Do
" Maximum Work Rate
" Feasible Work Rate
" Work Accomplishment
" Work Done
" Fraction Really Complete
" Effect of Work Progress
* Time to Discover Rework
Although this is one dominant loop in the Capstone project, it is but one of 117
loops in which overconfidence has an effect. Clearly, the simple impact of
overconfidence on quality is a complex behavior that warrants further study.
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In order to determine the impact of overconfidence, let us assume that the
maximum impact overconfidence can have on a product development process is
to reduce quality of production by 5% at the beginning of the project. We will
also assume that as the project matures, and as the rework due to quality is
discovered more quickly, that the confidence impact to quality will reduce to zero
at some point in the development process. For simplicity sake, we will tie this
relationship to the time it takes to discover rework. When the rework discovery
time is large, at the beginning of the program, overconfidence will likewise have
its largest impact (5%). A graphic representation of this confidence level is shown
in Figure 4-4. At the beginning of the program the quality factor multiplier starts
at 0.95 (a 5% reduction in quality). This impact will lessen as the time it takes to
discover rework reduces. The argument being, that as a project team discovers
their mistakes more quickly, the impact of overconfidence will lessen. The rate at
which it lessens should be proportional to the speed at which rework is
discovered. Once a product is measured for overconfidence, this loop can be
further calibrated, but without such measurements, we can now only estimate its
impact.
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Figure 4-4 Introduced Effect of Overconfidence on Product Quality Versus Time
Figure 4-5 shows the rate at which rework discovery improves. Early in the
program, it can take as long as a year (12 months) to discover that units need
rework. This is a long time for an engineer to be convinced that his/her process
is working properly, when in fact there are latent bugs, with rework required to fix
these bugs. As the product matures, the time to discover rework improves to a
couple of weeks. In this case the engineer receives faster feedback as to the
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Figure 4-5 Impact of Overconfidence on Time to Discover Rework
Given the impact overconfidence has on quality we must answer the question,
what impact does this have on parameters that really matter such as cost and
schedule? The first clue to this behavior is exhibited in the "Time to Discover
Rework" variable. The data in Figure 4-5 shows clear evidence that the time to
discover rework is negatively affected by the 5% overconfidence factor. The
curve shows a 5 month extension for the time it takes the program to reduce the
discovery time down to a few weeks. Instead of reaching steady state at 39
months, the project does not reach steady state until 44 months. This additional
time not only impacts cost and schedule, but has a trickle affect throughout the
program structure. Time to discover rework impacts 125 system dynamic loops
in the Capstone project structure. This is an incredible impact for what appears
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Figure 4-6 Effect of Overconfidence on Project Progress
Another telltale parameter is progress. Figure 4-6 shows both perceived
progress as well as actual progress for the base project case as well as the case
with the 5% overconfidence impact. One important thing to note is that in both
cases, the perceived progress is about the same. When using standard program
measures, very little difference is noticed between the standard case and the
overconfidence case. However, when actual progress is measured the effect of
a "small" 5% overconfidence impact is quite large. 100% progress is achieved 5
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Figure 4-7 Impact of Overconfidence on Project Staffing
As seen in Figure 4-7 staff level shows a similar effect. Not only has the project
time frame been extended, but the required staffing to complete the job shows a
significant surge of staff required at the end of the project to deal with the lower
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Figure 4-8 Effect of Overconfidence on Total Project Cost
The project cost, including imputed cost at a rate of 10 persons per month, is
shown in Figure 4-8. The 5% impact of overconfidence has cost the project a
33% cost growth! Clearly what is perceived as a small effect has dramatic
consequences.
Various methods have been employed to attempt to lower the bug rate of new
development such as code walk through, unit testing, integration test,
requirements verification and others. All these methods attempt to combat the
poorly understood phenomenon of human overconfidence. Although many of
these techniques have a positive impact, they are merely stabs at attempts to
deal with this poorly understood phenomenon. The basic phenomenon of
human overconfidence in engineering must be studied. Measurable
experimentation must be performed to quantify the human effect on engineering.
Only by rigorously producing a foundation of mathematical relationships to
describe overconfidence and its impact on the system engineering process can
- 48 -
we begin to understand the true impact of techniques that are meant to improve
the process.
Avenues for improvement
The first step in improving the effect of overconfidence in the system engineering
process is the measure its effects. Data gathering techniques must be employed
in the form of carefully crafted experiments. The data must be rigorously
analyzed to determine a quantifiable basis that can be used to predict not only
the effects of overconfidence, but the root causes of overconfidence. Only by
understanding the human nature behind the phenomenon can we ever hope to
manage and control it.
Several experimental factors are proposed that can be performed in isolation or
combined to begin to gather evidence for the purpose of determining the
mathematical relationships exhibited by human behavior. The goal here is to
build on the foundation of Utility Theory to produce useful relationships that can
guide the system engineering process and the human within it.
Authority
One questions as to whether this is possible. The human brain exhibits behavior
in two forms, stimulus response, and a property called "executive control". Earl
K. Miller13 summarizes this interplay quite well with the following paraphrased
description from his MIT lecture on "Cognitive Control: Understanding the Brain's
Executive." He describes the stimulus response section of the brain as simply
that. Any stimulus will automatically invoke a response that is pre-programmed
into the brain. Accident victims who have had damage to their frontal lobes
exhibit this behavior by catching a tennis ball when it is thrown at them, but
having no apparent conscious thoughts surrounding the action. In partnership to
this brain function is the Executive Control portion of the brain that operates in
the frontal lobe. This section of the brain can consciously control the stimulus
response section of the brain by consciously changing the brain's response to
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particular stimuli. In this way humans are able to set long term goals, make
conscious moral decisions, and direct behavior contrary to simple stimuli
response.
It is this complex interplay that makes the human difficult to quantify. Humans do
not behave as simple programmed machines responding to inputs, making
decisions and taking appropriate action. Humans use executive control to guide
responses to stimuli. Take for example Arrows impossibility Theorem discussed
earlier. If humans behaved as simple machines, a person could approach three
decision makers such as persons 1, 2, and 3. Now assume that the group has in
its possession option A (an Apple for example). You ask the group, for $0.25 you
can replace the Apple (option A) with a Banana (option B). The group will take
the vote, and prefer the Banana. You pocket $0.25. Next you offer the group, for
$0.25 you can replace the banana with a carrot (Option C). Again they agree,
and you now have $0.50. Now you offer the group an Apple (Option A) to
replace the Carrot (Option C) for $0.25, and again they agree. A stimuli
response based decision group will allow one to take all his/her money, the
process will never end. Humans do not usually behave this way. Depending on
the complexity of the offering, most humans will recognize the cycle and break
out of it (perhaps even "breaking the legs" of the person initiating the cycle!).
Humans use the executive control portion of their brain to avoid such logic traps.
The great mystery is how do humans accomplish this, and more importantly to
this thesis, how can such behavior be better integrated into the system
engineering process?
As we saw in the Milgram experiment, authority figures play a critical role in a
subject's behavior. The interplay between an engineer's behavior and his/her
supervisor cannot be ignored. In today's environment it is not possible to rerun
Milgram's experiment, however, adapting the premise of his results into the
engineering realm, several experiments are possible. Experiments can be
performed by setting the stage of a simple engineering situation that requires the
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subject to make some sort of decision. The data given to the subject is then
presented in a manner that emphasizes various forms of authority.
For example, one experiment may require a subject to predict the outcome of a
physical model given a simulation of the model. The source of the model may be
a coworker, a new graduate engineer, a domain expert, or a consultant. It is
suspected that the perception of the model will vary considerably depending on
the perceived source, as well as the experience level of the subject. An
experienced engineer who is told the simulation came from someone fresh out of
school will likely have low confidence in the simulation. A new engineer who is
told a simulation came from a domain expert will conversely have a relatively
high confidence in the simulation.
Hypothesis: An engineer given a data item will have distinctly different
confidence level of that data that depends on his/her perceived source of the
data.
Decision making timeliness
The time it takes to make a decision will also have an impact as to the
confidence of the decision. As we saw in the Space Shuttle Challenger case, the
Thiokol engineers had very little time to put together a convincing presentation:
One Day. They had to put together a convincing argument that the O-rings on
the solid rocket booster would leak with the extremely cold temperature on
January 28, 1986. The 13 charts presented were a hastily drawn up series of
charts that showed table after table of engineering data and hand written notes.
Not a single set of data was graphed to show trends. In fact, the charts were so
poor, that Thiokol's recommendation to scrub the launch fell easy prey to political
pressure to continue with the launch. Edward Tufte in his analysis of the data
stated "there are right ways and wrong ways to show data; there are displays that
reveal the truth and displays that do not."
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When an engineer works with a set of data there are varying amounts of effort
they can put in to analysis of the data depending on the task at hand and the
time allotted to perform the task. If too little time is taken to analyze, many of the
salient points may not be discovered, or not clearly presented. If too much time
is spent on the data, the common term "paralysis by analysis" results, and the
clear points may become muddied by placing too much attention on the
periphery issues. Confidence in the outcome will be maximized at the balance
point between under and over analysis. How do we find this point? One
potential experiment would involve presenting a subject with a set of data,
perhaps a simple computer program that must be slightly modified to handle a
set of input data. The subject will be allowed a specified period of time within
which to adapt the computer code to manipulate the data and form a desired
result. The time will be varied from subject to subject and task to task. The
subject must then, within the same time allotment, provide a presentation of the
data results that prove the code performed according to expectations. Once
complete, the subject will be subjected to an assessment process where he/she
will be required to defend the analysis. Confidence will be measured before and
after the assessment. The question is, will the subject give in to the assessment
pressure, and if so, what will the subject's confidence level be after the
assessment. Once a baseline experiment is generated, various techniques can
be employed in developing the analysis to determine which of these techniques
provide a more successful outcome.
Details of this experiment will be generated as part of the ESD PhD dissertation,
however it is hoped that the measurements taken from these experiments can
help quantify the human interaction with the decision making process. The
varying techniques employed in the analysis phase can be mapped into groups.
Some techniques may be more suitable for short time frame decisions. Others
may be more suitable for long term decisions. Currently, most engineering
techniques are prescribed in the same manner herbology is prescribed for
medical ailments. One particular engineer constantly suggests that Quality
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Function Deployment (QFD) is the answer to any analysis requirement. "Just
hold a QFD session, and you will be amazed." Little quantitative evidence exists
to prove that the engineering techniques employed today are integrated in any
way with the cognitive capabilities of the human brain. Like modern medicine
and experimental rigor has supplanted herbology, a quantifiable methodology for
integrating cognition into the systems engineering process must be developed.
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5 The Experiment
In order to take a first step towards measuring the human cognitive effect in
system engineering an experiment is designed that examines one of the many
hypotheses put forth in this thesis. The purpose of this experiment is to measure
the effects that various simulation presentation techniques have on the
confidence level of engineers making decisions about the outcome of a physical
process. In this experiment, a simple physical model is built, with an
accompanied set of two simulations, one graphical in nature and one a text only
simulation. Unbeknownst to the subject, the underlying simulation is identical in
both models. The subject is given one of the two simulations, and allowed to run
the simulation as an aid in predicting the actual outcome of the physical model.
The result will show that, in general, a graphical simulation will induce a higher
confidence level in the subject, but the distinction is not as clear as one would
expect. It turns out various other factors come into play that warrant further
study.
The questions we attempt to answer focuses primarily on the confidence level a
simulation transmits to a simulation user under various conditions. We pose the
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis: An engineer given a data item will have distinctly different
confidence level of that data that depends on his/her perceived source of the
data.
We explore this hypothesis further by posing the following questions;
* How does the perceived source of a simulation affect the confidence level
of the simulation user?
" How does the confidence level of the simulation builder affect the
confidence level of the simulation user?
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Both of these questions are related, but offer different dimensions in the equation
that would impact a simulation user's confidence level. The first question probes
the internal perception of the simulation user. In this case a subject will have no
communication with the model developer. Only the source of the model will be
revealed. For example, the subject will be told the simulation came from a newly
graduated student, or from a domain expert with 30 years experience. The
subject will map this piece of knowledge against an internal bias based on what
the subject knows about simulation building. The equation would produce an
effective utility function for using the model, as well as a different effective utility
function for not using the model. The greater the difference between these tow
functions, the greater the deviation in confidence levels.
To describe this characteristic, we turn to Utility Theory. In traditional utility
theory, the utility of the subject determines his/her preference for a particular
outcome. The subject will make an implicit decision on whether to use a
simulation or not. The outcome of a model run is not affected by the simulation.
The traditional utility theory tree would look like the one in Figure 5-1. First the
subject decides whether of not to use the results of the simulation. Next, the
model is run, and the subject receives a fixed payoff based on whether or not
they accurately predicted the outcome of the model within some specified
interval. The tree indicates, that in a case where the subject has no control over
the payoff, there is no reason to use the simulation. The utility function is
described as some function
U(Payoff) = f(perceived risk, value)
Where U defines the relative value of a particular payoff. The function "f' is the
mapping of a payoff to the utility value. A risk taker's utility function would sway
towards taking additional risk in order to obtain a higher payoff, while a risk
adverse subject would rather lower risk at the price of a lower potential payoff. In
the tree below, a risk taker would choose to run the model accepting the risk or
no payoff if there is a chance of getting a high payoff. A risk adverse subject may
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decide to take the walk away price (something less than the payoff) and not run
















U(Use Simulation) = U(Don't Use Simulation)
No Point in using simulation!
Figure 5-1 Impact of Simulation with Traditional Utility Theory
In the case where the subject is now allowed to modify his/her payoff based on
the simulation results, the decision to use a simulation in determining the payoff
will have a direct impact on the decision tree. The subject will likely modify the
payoff structure based on the simulation outcome. This will not affect the
subject's natural utility function, but it does have an impact of the effective utility
function of the subject. If the subject uses the simulation, he/she will form a bias
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rice)
directly related to the confidence level achieved from running the simulation.
This effective utility, also shown in Figure 5-2, can be written as
U'(Payoff) = f(perceived risk, value, confidence in the simulation)
Such that
U1(Payoff) = f(perceived risk, value) if simulation is used
And
U2(Payoff) = f(perceived risk, value) if simulation is not used
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U1(Use Simulation)# U2(Don't Use Simulation)
Simulation Biases Utility
Figure 5-2 Utility Theory Decision Tree incorporating Confidence in
Simulation
This thesis attempts to define U', or at least methods of measuring U' so as to
better understand the impact simulations have of a subjects utility function.
Another question we will explore is,
* How does the presentation of the simulation affect the utility of the
subject?
Many people believe that a "slicker" presentation will be more effective in
delivering confidence (however biased) to the subject. The more realistic the
simulation the better it broadcasts confidence. Again, we will explore methods of
determining the impact of presentation style on the utility of the subject.
By quantifying the effects of overconfidence in Utility Theory, we hope to better
understand the phenomenon. The resulting basis can be used to measure and
assess various industry tools and their impact and effectiveness on decision
makers.
5.1 Building the experiment
In the design of this experiment human subjects are asked to make probability
judgments about the outcome of three physical processes. The experiment will
focus on a set of study factors targeted at determining the effects of various
qualities of simulation on the confidence of the simulation user. By keeping the
number of factors small we can initially perform an exhaustive study of each
factor. As we learn more we will be required to design more optimal approaches,
such as fractional factorial or "one factor at a time" techniques. This is due to the
nature of the data collection. As we will see, each data point collected requires
30-60 minutes of effort.
Study Factors:
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The study factors focus on three in particular; source of the simulation, subject
involvement in the simulation, and appearance of the simulation. Simulation
source will assess the confidence level the subject places on a simulation that
has been handed to him/her by developers of four different experience and
authority levels. In each of these cases, there will be no actual difference in the
simulation given to the subject. The only factor that will be different is the stated
source of the simulation.
Source of the simulation: Simulation developed by:
" College Co-op student
" New employee with 2 years experience
" Domain expert "Chief Engineer" Employee
" Outside consultant
Subject involvement in the simulation will assess how the utility function of the
subject is modified based on the involvement the subject has with the
manipulation of the simulation. Once a simulation is given to the subject, the
subject will be allowed to interact with the simulation in only one of three different
ways.
Subiect Involvement in developing the simulation
* None (Observer) - Simluation shown, decision based on results shown
* Personal (Model User) - Calibrate simulation, work alone
" Social (Co-Worker) - Guide calibration done by engineer with working
knowledge of model
In the "None" case, the experimentor is the only person who comes in contact
with the simulation. The subject observes the simulation and decides how
he/she will use the data to predict the outcome of the model. In the "Personal"
case, the subject works alone to calibrate the simulation based on parameters
observed from the physical model. The subject can observe a limited allowed set
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of calibration oprations and choose the parameters from which to calibrate the
simulation. In the "social" case, the subject works with someone who is
"intimate" with the simulation. This person can either pose as the developer of
the model, or someone who has been trained by the expert who developed the
model. The subject interacts with this person to calibrate the experiment before
running the model. Since the person performing the calibration is intimate with
the simulation, any suitable parameter can be modified, however, care must be
taken that the text only simulation not be exposed during this process. If the
subject accidentaly observes the graphics based simulation underlying the text, it
will skew the results of the experiment.
Each of these three modes involves increasing socialization of the simulation.
The first case is the most isolated, while the last case is the most interactive. In
the "Social" case, care must be taken to portray a consistent confidence level
across the experiments. Varying the exhibited confidence level of the simulation
expert may be a factor taken into consideration on future experimental runs.
The next major factor is in the appearance of the simulation. It is very important
to note at this point that the actual simulation for each model is identical. Three
levels of appearance are designed into the simulation:
Appearance the simulation
" No graphics - alphanumerical output only
* Simple graphics - Animations, simple shapes: do not match the physical entity
* Photorealistic - same as "simple graphics.", realistic images
The simulation is developed based on one mathematical simulation process that
is used to compute the physics of the model in question. The "No Graphics"
display of the simulation will employ only text based schemes to gather input
parameters and display output parameters. No physical representation of the
model will be visible. In the case of "Simple Graphics" basic blocks and shapes
are employed to form a physical representation of the model. The same text
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based input and output mechanisms will exist in this simulation, however, the
subject will be able to see the operation of the simulated model, hopefully
providing a higher confidence in the simulation. Lastly the photoralistic version of
the simulation places actual pictures of the model on the screen, attached to the
block model but displayed as if the photo were the simulated model. An
interesting question is posed here: Do photorealistic graphics provide any higher
confidence to the subject than a block model approximation?
Study Factors Matrix
The experiment is designed as a full factorial 3X3X3 matrix. Two of the three
dimentions are shown in the Table 5-1. Subject Involvement, (Factor A) is shown
against Simulation Appearance (Factor B). Each table is repeated for factor C,
the Simulation Source Factor. Each experiment is run 20 times to provide a
statisticaly relevant data set. Taking into account that each experiment takes
approximately 45-60 minutes to run, a complete experiment run would require
3X3X3X20 = 540 hours. Even with an optimized procedure a 30 minute run
would still only take half that time, 270 hours.
Number of Experiments Subject Involvement (Factor A)
180 X 3 source factors None - Al Personal - A2 Social - A3
540 trials (Observer) (Model User) (Co-Worker)
No graphics: 20 2020 2020Simulation B-1
Simple graphics:
Appearance 20 20 20
B-2
(Factor B) Photorealistic: 20 20 20
B-3
Table 5-1 Experiment Factors for the Designed Experiment
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The first pass of this experiment is reduced in scope to a level that could be
completed reasonably within the time frame of this thesis. We will call this round
of experiments the "trial experiments". The main purpose of these experiments is
to complete a set of trial runs of actual experiments and use the data to refine the
full factorial experiment. In this manner, at least one phase of experimental
errors can be eliminated from the data set, and provide a more solid
experimental data set when the full experiment is run. The simulation source is
limited to a single factor, and only two levels of each of the other factors are
included in the experiment. Thus the number of experiments is reduced to a
managable level, 2x2x10 = 40 trials. A summary of the first run is shown in Table
5-2. The 40 trials in this experiment are run at 30 minute lengths for a total
experiment time of 20 hours.
Subject Involvement (Factor A)
None - Al Personal - A2 Social - A3
First Trial: 40 trials (Observer) (Model User) (Co-Worker)




(Factor B) " I I I I
Table 5-2 Experiment Factors for the "Trial Experiments"
- 62 -
5.2 The Models
The experiment is designed to employ a set of three physical models, each with
a unique physical aspect that is critical to design performance. The three
models consist of a dragster, and spring mechanism, and a catapult. A sample
of each of these is shown in Figure 5-3, Figure 5-4, and Figure 5-5.
Figure 5-3 Full Experiment Model #1, The Dragster
The dragster model appears relatively easy to build, however various
characteristics of the Lego MindstorMTM material used to to build the model
provide a significant challenge in operating the model. We will go into these
issues in the next section as we discuss the difficulties in building the dragster.
The dragster is set at a starting line, and the subject must predict the time it will
take for the dragster to cross a finish line at some defined distance along a track.
- 63 -
Figure 5-4 Full Experiment Model #2, The Jumping Mechanism
The spring mechanism is a simple device of two pieces of hinged wood
connected by a rubber band. Before the device is released, the user predicts the
height that the device will go into the air. The challenge with this device is
obtaining an accurate measure of the height the object travels.
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Figure 5-5 Full Experiment Model #3, The Sling Shot
The Sling shot device will toss a tennis ball down a track, and the subject must
predict the distance at which the ball will hit the ground. The subject would
calibrate the elasticity and stretched length of the rubber band.
The Trial Experiment Models
The trial experiment only produced the dragster model, however with the ease of
using the Lego Mindstorm kit, one additional model, a 4 wheel drive model was
also produced in oder to provide at least one other model with which to run
experiments. These models are shown in figures Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7.
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Front
Figure 5-6 Trial Experiment Model #1, The Dragster
The Dragster model includes a light sensor (block behind the wheel) integrated
with an on board timer. When the light sensor crosses a black line, it will stop the
vehicle, and display the run time. In this way, there is no doubt as the actual
outcome of the trial. In fact, we do not want any uncertainty in the actual
outcome, as it may add unwanted effects to any followon trials performed with
the same subject. The key attribute of the dragster is the center of gravity of the
model. When the vehicle motors start, the front wheels jump off the ground. In
fact if the motor speed is set too high the vehicle will completely flip over. The
user must estimate the wheel speed as the input parameter to the simulation of
the Dragster. The motor speed of the vehicle is controlled by the Lego
MindstormTM software. The software has the flexibility to change the motor
voltage, however this lower voltage settings to not provide enough power to





Figure 5-7 Trial Experiment Model #2: The 4 Wheel Drive
The 4 Wheel Drive model is shown in Figure 5-7. The model has one motor on
each side of the vehicle. His motor drives 2 gears, each with a gear ratio of 5 to
1. Even though the gear ratio on the front and back wheels are the same, the
wheel diameter is different by a ratio of 4 to 1.75. In this model, the slippage
caused by the different wheel diameters will induce an uncertainty in the total
vehicle speed. Also with this model, the light sensor, in front of the vehicle, will
provide an accurate measure of how long it takes the vehicle to complete the
assigned track.
The track, shown in Figure 5-8, is a 5 foot long stream of 8/" by 11" paper taped
together with a black line drawn at the end. The light sensor will allow either
vehicle to continue moving until a dark region is encountered.
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Figure 5-8 Track used for Experiment Model Runs
The vehicles were designed to operate symetricaly, that is the voltage applied to
the two motors is identical. In trail runs of the experiment, however, the vehicles
simply did not go straight. Approximately 10% of the trials finished successfully.
This required significant rework of the experiment.
After many different experiments, the track was modified to include two 2x4
wooden beams along the sides of the track. In addition, the models needed to
be modified to include a couple of "straigthening bars". When the models ran
askew, the straightening bar would gently push the model back towards center.








Figure 5-9 Trial Experiment Model #1, The Dragster - Final Model
Light Sensor
Straightening Bars
Figure 5-10 Trial Experiment Model #2: The 4 Wheel Drive - Final Model
In building the two models for this experiment, the author exhibited the very
phenonemon of study in this thesis. The original model was certain to work. The
addition of the light sensor to the model proved a fool proof way of measuring the
run time of the model to eliminate any doubt in the subject's mind as to the
outcome. That very light sensor put into motion a series of events that would
lead to the final models. When the dragster was first outfitted with the light
sensor, a single sheet of paper with a dark line served as the finish line for the
trial. The dragster was started, and after a quick hop, simply stopped in place. It
turned out that the wood floor the model was run on, was just dark enough for the
ligh sensor to qualify it as black. This led to the addition of a series of paper,
taped together to form a white track, 5 feet long and 11" wide. Later the bars and
side rails were added to keep the models going straight.
After each "fix", the builder was absoloutly certain that the model would no
operate as expected, and each time, another "kink" surface. The two main
events, the light sensor operation, and the motor speed inequities, served as the
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"and then something happens" events to kick the builder into a fresh cycle of
discovery. The current model operates properly most of the time. In only one
instance did a failure occur in the 40 experiments performed.
5.3 The Simulations
Each of the two models were simulated using a simulation package called
"Working Model". Working model is a physical simulation package. A designer
can "build" a simulation out of shapes, tie the shapes together with pins, levers,
gears, and a variety of other connection devices to create a two dimentional
simulation of nearly any physical structure. More detail on Working Model can be
found at http://www.workinqmodel.com/overview.html.
One simulation is produced for each model. This is an important point because
we are trying to measure the confidence difference in a simulation presentation.
Keeping the basic simulation that produces the data the same ensures that any
discrepancies in the simulation will not induce exraneous factors in the
experiment. The two possible presentations of the Dragster Model are shown in
Figure 5-11 and Figure 5-12. While the two presentations of the 4 Wheel Drive
model are shown in Figure 5-13 and Figure 5-14.
The subject is permitted to change the motor speed in units of degrees per
second. He/She also has the flexibility to run and stop the simulation, step
forward and backward, and to reset the simulation. For the text only simulations,
the subject only has two parameters with which to observe the simulation output;
time and position. With the graphical simulation, the subject has the added
ability to watch the simulation and the extraneous effects that the simulation is
displaying. For example. In the dragster simulation, the first couple of seconds,
the dragster will do a short hop based on the center of gravity of the simulated
object. The real model will also hop in a similar manner. In the text only
simulation the subject will not be able to observe this effect. Likewise, the 4
wheel drive simulation will display irregular speed based on the fact that the
wheel diameters are different, even though both wheels are driven by the same
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motor. The difference in friction is small, but observable in the graphic
simulation, but not in the text only simulation.
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Figure 5-13 Simulation of the 4 Wheel Drive Model -Text Only
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Figure 5-14 Simulation of the 4 Wheel Drive Model - Graphic Simulation
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5.4 Subject Input Templates
For each experiment the data is collected in a excel template as shown in Figure
5-15. The data template contains a place for the subject to enter the simulation
outcome, however, the subject is also allowed to change this outcome to support
his/her predictions. This data is entered in the two boxes towards the upper left
of the screen, under "How long to you think it will take the car to cross the finish
line".
Subject Prediction Entry Form
Subject Name: lExample Template
I Subject fills in all light yellow cells
How long to you think it will take the car to cross the finish line:
10 seconds
9.2 Simulation outcome





9.75 9.50 9.25 9.00 8.75 8.50 8.25 8.00 7.75 7.50 7.25
10.25 10.50 10.75 11.00 11.25 11.50 11.75 12.00 12.25 12.50 12.75
.aues must a
0.4 0.7 0.9 0.95 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 increasng
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.05 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0
Potential Payoff: $ 0.40 $ 0.30 $ 0.20 $ 0.05 $ 0.05 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
Actual Outcome




Figure 5-15 Data Collection Template for Experiment
The subject's guess, entered in the shaded box, is used as a basis from which to
establish a set of intervals. In Figure 5-15, the simulation outcome is 9.2
seconds, but the user believes for some reason that 10 seconds is more likely.
In exit interviews it was discovered that the subjects did not have confidence in
their own ability to measure the wheel speed, so decided to add in a buffer in the
direction they believed the error to lie.
Once the prediction is made of the expected outcome, the subject is then asked
to fill in the probability that the model results will fall within a set of intervals
around the expected outcome. An example distribution is shown in Figure 5-16.
This figure shows that the user assigned a probability of 0.4 for the interval from
9.75 to 10.25 seconds, 0.7 for the interval from 9.5 seconds to 10.5 seconds, and
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so on. It was critical to explain to the subjects that the probabilities assigned to
the interval was cumulative. Most engineers tend to think in terms of gaussian
distributions. Nearly every engineer started out thinking they were assigning the
levels to each additive sucessive interval, rather than the cumulative interval. In
short, engineers tend to think in terms of the graph in Figure 5-16.
0.2 - ------ -- --- -- - -- ---- - - - -- ---- - -- -- ---- r - - - --- - - -11- -- - - -T ------ ---- - - --- -- - - --- ----- -- --- -
03- -- --- ------ -
7.25 7.5 7.75 8 8.25 8.5 5.75 9 9.25 9.5 9.75 10 10.25 10.5 10.75 11 11.25 11.5 11.75 12 12-25 12.5 12.75
Model Run Time: Predicted Time= 10
Figure 5-16 User Assigned Probability Distribution
Once the subject assigns probabilities to the intevals, the next question asked is
for the subject to indicate his/her walk away price. The subject has assigned
probabilites to the indicated intervals to determine the payoff for each interval. In
our example, the payoff can be anywhere from $0.40 to $0.00. In the example of
Figure 5-15, the walkaway price is $0.20. This indicates that for $0.20, the
subject would rather forgoe the opportunity of winning $0.40, rather than risk not
getting anything. The user assigned probability tree for example scenario is
shown in Figure 5-16. Clearly, in this example, the subject does not have much
confidence in the assigned probabilities. The Walk Away price is $0.20, while the
expected outcome from running the model is $0.30.
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Probability Tree for Example
E(Run Model) = $
E(Walk Away) =
Interval
0.30 , 0 Interval







-.20 M* Walk Away price = 0.20
Figure 5-17 User Assigned Probability Tree -vs- Walk Away
The template in Figure 5-15 is filled out for each model run. In the case of this
experiment there are a total of four model runs. Each is explained in the Protocol
section. Lastly, once the model is run, the outcome is entered in the appropriate
box, and the subject collects any payoff.
5.5 Experiment Protocol
The experiment protocol is designed to obtain the level of confidence a subject
has in the simulation. One way to do this is to present the experiment in terms of
a gamble. After all, in real life, engineers use simulations to predict potential
outcomes. The prediction is a gamble that the outcome from the simulation will
match the real outcome of the object being engineered. The subject is asked to
use the simulation to predict the outcome of the model run. Then the subject is








subject. It is this utility that will measure how much risk the subject is willing to
take in predicting the outcome. A detailed protocol description follows.
The subject enters the experiment room where a test track is set up similar to the
one in Figure 5-8. The subject is asked to sit in front of a computer with a screen
displaying either Figure 5-11 or Figure 5-13. The subject will also see the two
models as in Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10. The experimentor stands next to the
models and asks the subject for his/her resume.
Next, the experimentor will explain to the subject his/her role in the experiment.
"You are being asked to take part in an experiment that investigates the use of
simulations to predict the outcome of model trials. Your job is to use the
simulation on the computer in front of you," Experimentor points to computer
screen, "to predict how long it will take this model," Experimentor pick up the
model that matches the simulation on the computer, "to go down this six foot long
track. This model is outfitted with a light sensor that will detect the dark line at
the end of the track. Once the light sensor is tripped, the model's internal timer
will stop, indicating within 0.1 seconds the travel time for the model."
The simulation presented to the subject is one of the two text only simulations.
The model chose will alternate between subjects from the dragster to the 4 wheel
drive.
" The simulation before you was produced by a graduate student who was asked
to create a simulation of this model. You have the ability to change the motor
speed in the simulation, and to run the simulation forward and backward to obtain
an accurate measurement." experimentor describes the buttons on the
simulation window. "Also, you may operate this model in any way you like to
obtain the motor speed aside from actualy running the model on the test track."
The subjects then employ a variety of techniques, from watching a mark on the
wheel and timing the rotations, to measuring gear ratios. The subject enters the
estimated motor speed in the "Motor Velocity" box, and then manipulates the
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simulation to obtain an answer. The purpose of this is discussed further in the
"Exit Interviews" section. Once the subject assigns the expected outcome,
he/she then is asked to assign a probability to that outcome, as well as the
probability of the outcome associated with the increasing intervals around the
estimate. For example, if the simulation produced an estimated time of 10
seconds, and the subject goes with this answer, the subject must assign a
probability that the model will finish the track between 9.75 and 10.25 seconds.
Next the subject must answer the same question for the interval from 9.5 to 10.5.
This probability must be greater than the first probability, since the new interval
includes the previous interval. The subject is allowed to define up to 11 intervals,
or can define less than 11 intervals by assigning a probability of 1 for the last
interval. The assignment of a 1 to an interval indicates that the user believes the
probability of the model finishing outside that interval is zero.
Once the subject assignes the probabilities to the intervals, the excel sheet will
show the subject the potential payoff for each interval. The experimentor then
asks, "Given the indicated payoffs, and the probabilities you assigned to each
interval, what is your walk away price? That is given you could win up to $O.XX
(whatever the maximum assigned) or walk away with nothing, what would you
take to not run the model?" This question requires the subject to think about the
probabilities he/she has assigned and to determine his/her confidence in the
assignments.
Once this first pass is complete, the experiment is repeated for the same model,
but with a different set of wheels. For example the model in Figure 5-9, the
Dragster is modified such that the rear wheel diameter changes from 3.25" to 2"
as shown in Figure 5-18. The purpose of the modification is to determine the
confidence level that is carried over when the subject is required to extrapolate
the results of a simulation to a similar but different model. This time, the subject
is not allowed to re-run the simulation. He/She must use the simulation estimate
from the original run. The spreadsheet is identical to the first sheet, the only
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difference being the entry cell for the simulation run is removed as it is not
applicable.
Figure 5-18 Model Variation for Dragster
The protocol is repeated again for the other model. This time, however, a
graphics based simulation is shown such as the ones in Figure 5-12 or Figure
5-14. The subject sees the simulated model run down the track. All the other
parameters are identical to the first simulation. Motor speed is the controlled
variable, with the subject having the ability to control the simulation run in the
same way as the previous simulation. The entire procedure is repeated again
with two more spreadsheets filled out by the subject. For the second model, the
alteration involves switching both sets of wheels. As shown in Figure 5-19, the
1.75" and 2" diameter wheels are replaced with 3.25" diameter wheels.
Figure 5-19 Model Variation for 4 Wheel Drive
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Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 summarize the control parameters and the variation
parameters used in this experiment. In a later phase, the shaded regions will be






Table 5-3 Model Control Parameters
Models / Vairations
Dragster: M-1





Table 5-4 Model Variation Parameters
5.6 Exit Interviews
The subjects were required to participate in a set of exit interviews where the true
purpose of the experiment was revealed. Details of the experiment were
discussed with the subjects, particularly the fact that the text only and graphics
based simulations were identical. Several themes were common to most
subjects. Most all believed that a graphic simulation was hidden behind the text
only simulation. Early subjects agrebd that the subject should perform all
simulations before running any of the models. And lastly, all subjects believed




saver, as they would have simply modified the motor speed to reach the desired
answer in any case. Each of these issues is discussed.
Perception of an underlying graphical simulation when viewing the text
simulation:
The protocol used for each experimental subject is crafted such that for each run,
the subject will first observe the text only simulation, and then the graphics
simulation. This is done primarily due to the similar appearance of the
simulations. If a subject sees the graphic simulation such as the one in Figure
5-12, a confidence level will be set in the simulation based on the graphics. If the
subject then sees a simulation such as the one in Figure 5-13, the subject will
suspect that there is a similarity between the simulations. In fact, during several
exit interviews, it became apparent that the subject suspected the simulations
were all graphic based simulations. The subjects, after having seen the graphics
simulation, believed that the text only simulation was hiding a simular graphics
based simulation for the second model. Several early experimental trials were
invalidated due to this unforseen bias. All the trails discussed in the experiment
results section were performed in the order of text based simulation, then graphic
based simulation. In future experiments, efforts should be taken to diversify the
appearance of the simulations. Perhaps getting Working Model to dump results
to a text file, rather than allow direct interaction, or use a Matlab based simulation
with the output either graphics based or text based. In any case, the appearance
of the simulation will aid in eliminating any cross perception biases.
Running all the simulations before running the models:
In early trials, the subject would fill out one spreadsheet at a time, run the model
for that trial, and then move to the next trial. The resulting data, as well as exit
interviews, indicated that cross pollination existed in confidence results across
the experiment trials. The simulation confidence on the second run was
impacted by the results of the first model run. This makes sense, since
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observation of an outcome from a model run will bias the subject during the next
prediction interval. It is not possible for the subject to either not relish in his/her
winnings, or be cautious having just lost the opportunity to win some money.
Allowing the user to modify the simulation answer:
In early trials, it was discovered that the subject would spend time manipulating
the simulation to "tweak" the outcome to account for any percieved errors they
may have made in the calibration procedure. For example if the subject timed
the rotation of the model wheel, and believed that the wheel took a few extra
rotations than indicated, they would increase the motor speed value accordingly.
The protocol and spreadsheet was modified to allow the subject to simply enter
his/her best guess based on the simulation outcome. This was done primarily to
save experiment time. Exit interviews indicate that the final answer would be the
same regardless. However, this does highlight one additional factor that should
be considered in future experiments. The time permitted to manipulate the
simulation will have a direct impact on the subjects confidence in the simulation.
If the subject is allowed a limited time to observe the model and make a single
entry into the simulation, the confidence will likely be lower than if the subject is
permitted free reign to manipulate the model at will. This factor should be
included in the next experiment combined with the factor "Subject Involvement"
factor.
5.7 Results
The results show that a definite measurable improvement in confidence exists
when subjects are working with graphical models rather than text models. This
improvement is slight but clear for this simple experiment. The results presented
will show typical probability distributions assigned by the subjects. The expected
payoff is compared against the walk-away price. This difference defines the
subject's willingness to run the experiment. Finally, the difference is compared
for both text and graphics based simulations. The data shows a definite bias in
confidence for graphics based models.
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Typical user assigned probability intervals are shown in Figure 5-20,Figure 5-21,
Figure 5-22, and Figure 5-23 for the Dragster, Modified Dragster, 4 Wheel Drive,
and Modified 4 wheel drive simulations respectively. In all of the 40 results, there
is no clear distinction in probability assignments for graphics versus text based
simulations. In all figures shown, two of the distributions are for a text based
simulation and three are for a graphics based simulation. The first and last
distributions in each case were from text based simulations. The center three
were from graphics based simulation. There are simply no common
characteristics distinguishable between the two groups. Confidence in text
based versus graphics based simulations is simply not observable in the way
users assign probability distributions.
As the experimenter observed the subjects, it became apparent that the subjects
were assigning the probabilities almost arbitrarily. Subjects would change the
primary cell probability with no real reasoning. When asked if they had a reason
for choosing the probability, the subject simply said that they were trying to
balance the payout, not necessarily optimize based on confidence in the
simulation. However, when the subject was asked about the walk-away price the
subject would sit back and consider the confidence in the simulation.
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User Assigned Probability Distribution: Dragster Model
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User Assigned Probability Distribution: Modified Dragster Model
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Figure 5-21 User Assigned Distribution for Modified Dragster
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Figure 5-23 User Assigned Distribution for Modified 4 Wheel Drive
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In Figure 5-24 we show the distribution of the subject estimates for each of the
four simulations. Note again, that there is no clear distinction in the data for text
based or graphics based simulations. Each plot is clustered around some mean
estimate. There is not enough data to determine if the distribution is Gaussian,
or some other distribution. Note as well, the tight clustering of the data. The
engineers performing the calculations to calibrate the simulation took care to
accurately measure the wheel speed of the models, and to extrapolate the data
to a modified model. This indicates that the subject performing the experiment
took serious interest in the experiment. Inattentive subjects would likely show up
as outliers, who did not carefully perform the calibration measurements to enter
the data into the simulation. This is also a characteristic of keeping the
simulation simple. With only one parameter to input, the calibration could be
performed within the time frame of the experiment. A warning exists here for
those experimenters that would add more factors in the calibration cycle. Each
factor added will significantly increase the experiment time. The engineers
participating in these experiments took care to "get it right".
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Distribution of Subject Estimates (seconds)
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Figure 5-24 Distribution of Subject Estimates
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2
The outcome of each of the model runs is shown in Figure 5-25. Most of the
variation is due to the rough surface, and friction with the side rails. In some
experiments, the model would run straight without touching the side rail. In many
experiments the model would touch the side rail three quarters the way down the
track. In a few experiments the model would, almost magnetically, race towards
the side rail, and follow it to the finish line. The highly variable motors of the
Lego MindstormTM model made the outcome very unpredictable. It is quite
surprising that the model outcome data is clustered as tightly as shown! In future
experiments, models should be constructed that can either account for the
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Figure 5-25 Distribution of Model Run Outcomes
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In Figure 5-26 and Figure 5-27 we begin to see evidence of the impact of the text
based versus graphics based simulations. In comparing the walk away price
indicated by the subject to the probability distribution, we begin to see clustering
of preferences in the subject's assignments. The first plot in Figure 5-26 shows a
slight shift to the left, indicating a preference to walk away from the model run.
This third plot, on the other hand shows the same data shifted to the right,
indicating a preference to run the model. The only difference between these two
plots is the type of simulation shown. The first plot was based on a text based
simulation, while the third plot was based on a graphics based simulation of the
same model. Likewise, plots two and four show the same relationship for the
modified model.
Another relationship to note is between the first and second plots. The difference
here is between a simulation that directly simulates the model, and an
extrapolation of the same simulation to a related model, the modified model. A
very slight difference exists between plots one and two, however a slightly more
visible bias is apparent between plots three and four. Since the simulation is not
accurately depicting the modified model, an apparent loss in confidence level is
evident in this data. The slight shift to the left indicates a bias towards walking
away rather than running the model.
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Distribution of Walkaway Preference (-: walk away)
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Figure 5-27 Distribution of Walk-away Preference - 4 Wheel Drive
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In Figure 5-28 we plot the change in confidence attributed to each of the four
models. In each graph we plot a histogram of the difference between the graphic
simulation confidence and the text only confidence. The first plot shows a slight
bias toward the graphic simulation of the dragster. A positive value on these
plots indicates that the subject would rather walk away from a model run more
when the simulation was text based rather than graphics based. The cluster of
points is around 0.15, which indicates a slightly higher confidence in the graphics
simulation. Note that in all four cases, the graphical simulation gave the subject
a slightly higher confidence level.
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Figure 5-28 Distribution of Confidence Preference for Graphics Simulation
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Figure 5-29 shows the confidence difference when extrapolating a simulation for
a modified model. In these plots we took the difference between the base model
and the modified model for all of the four simulations. In each case, a slight loss
in confidence is evident by the slight shift in the cluster of data points towards the
negative side of the graph. This indicates that the subject was more likely to
walk away from a model run when a modified model was used.
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Several conclusions are evident from the data:
* Subjects showed slightly higher confidence in graphics based models.
* Subjects showed a slight loss in confidence when extrapolating simulation
results to modified models.
* Although the results show a definite trend, the measurable confidence levels




It is recommended that a more extensive experiment be performed to verify the
results in this thesis. Although trends did appear in the data, the sample size is
rather small at only 40 participants. In addition, the experiment itself was
somewhat transparent in that many of the subjects suspected that the underlying
simulations for the text versus graphics were identical. The subjects, upon exit
interviews, suspected the purpose of experiment, and may have biased the
results.
An expansion of this experiment should investigate ways to normalize the
confidence difference between the two types of simulations. A variety of steps
could be added in the experiment to attempt to equalize the confidence levels.
The subject may be asked to:
" list all the factors that may invalidate the simulation
" list all the factors that may invalidate the model (based on the simulation)
" list any calibration factors that the simulation should be taking into account
* list all the differences between the simulation and the model
" list any modification that should be made to the model to better approximate
the simulation
By asking the subject to think about the differences between the simulation and
the model the subject will hopefully think about the fidelity of the simulation, and
more accurately assess his/her confidence in the simulation.
Similar experiments must be constructed to test the hypothesis set out in this
thesis. Much of engineering involves people. By understanding the cognitive




A summary of the hypotheses in this thesis is listed here:
Hypothesis: Better presentation of a system's data processing allows easier
adaptation of the system to new data effects.
Hypothesis: The confidence level of a decision maker will amplify a decision
maker's natural utility, regardless of directly conflicting evidence presented to the
decision maker.
Hypothesis: Engineers will initially trust a computer outcome, even if it is
completely wrong.
Hypothesis: Domain experts exhibit many of the same characteristics as mature
companies. Both are under "market" pressure to maintain domain expertise, and
as such are vulnerable to the same overconfidence dilemma.
Hypothesis: People will make decisions with enhanced confidence if they believe
some authority supports that decision, regardless of whether the authority truly
exists.
Hypothesis: Peer groups, as compared to individuals, will display abnormally
high confidence levels as long as the group maintains cohesion. Once cohesion
is lost, the group confidence will disintegrate.
Hypothesis: An engineer given a data item will have distinctly different
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